This paper is a philosophical defense of the doctrine of penal substitution.
Introduction
Throughout the history of Christian doctrine, the cross of Christ has proved to be a magnet for widespread theological interpretation. We possess Irenaeus's recapitulation theory, Gregory of Nyssa's fish-hook theory, Athanasius's mystical theory, Augustine's ransom theory, Abelard's moral-influence theory, Anselm's satisfaction theory, Scotus's acceptilation theory, and Calvin's theory of penal substitution, to name only a few of the historical stand-outs. 1 Since the Reformation, divergent views of the atoning work of Christ have ballooned all the more, with the typical battle line drawn between objective and subjective theories. 2 Even philosophers have gotten into the fray. Kant and Kierkegaard each have extended discussions of the atonement, and in contemporary, analytic philosophy, the likes of Philip Quinn, Eleonore Stump, Richard
Swinburne, John Hare, and David Lewis have published on the doctrine of the atonement. 3 While no one theory of the atonement has received the stamp of orthodoxy within Christendom, amongst many conservative Christians various versions of the theory of penal substitution continue to rule the day. 4 And yet, outside of these conservative circles, the notion of penal substitution is dismissed out of hand. Keith Ward, for instance, represents a fairly common stance, "One must therefore reject those crude accounts of Christian doctrine which…say that Christ has been justly punished in our place so that he has taken away our guilt and enabled God to forgive us. Almost everything is ethically wrong about these accounts." 5 Many of us simply cannot swallow the idea of a God who is unable to deal with his anger over sin in any other way than by doling out punishment to sinners or to the incarnate Christ as a penal substitute.
While I am sympathetic to such sentiments, I am equally moved by the historical legacy of penal accounts of the atonement and the corresponding biblical evidence in favor of such understandings of the cross of Christ. Furthermore, and more germane to this present paper, the doctrine of penal substitution offers a rationale for the cross that appears lacking on rival accounts. There is, of course, much more to the person and work of Christ as the means of salvation than merely his death on the cross for human sin, but this latter notion remains a central biblical and theological theme that deserves careful delineation. Since many have found the idea of penal substitution to be morally suspect, my aim here is to take a further step towards a contemporary philosophical defense of the doctrine. 6 One of the most recent and most compelling attempts to put forth a philosophical defense of Christ's atonement is found in Richard Swinburne's Responsibility and Atonement. While
Swinburne's theory is not a penal view of the atonement, Swinburne does present Christ's person and work as a means to satisfy the moral debt sinners owe to God. In so doing, I will argue that Swinburne prepares the ground for a plausible understanding of the doctrine of penal substitution. In the critical part of this paper I lay out Swinburne's satisfaction-type theory and surface one central weakness of it-a weakness which provides some motivation for a renewed look at the doctrine of penal substitution. This leads to the constructive part of the paper in which I attempt to harness Swinburne's methodological approach to atonement theorizing and put it to work in favor of a theory of penal substitution.
I. Swinburne's Theory
The Moreover, Swinburne assumes that "God seeks man's eternal well-being in friendship with himself", and that God has worthwhile tasks with which humans can participate. 18 For instance, we can help God in reconciling others to himself and to one another, we can grow in the contemplation of God and his universe, and we can help in beautifying the universe. Since these great opportunities are available to us, we do a great wrong to God in failing to take steps towards fulfilling these ends.
Thus, Swinburne holds that we have failed to fulfil our duties to God, "badly abusing" the opportunities he has given us. 19 We owe God first-rate lives, though we live second-rate lives at best. And so, human persons are sinners, they are in debt to God because of their sins, and they are obligated to make atonement to God for their wrongdoing. 20 Swinburne writes, "it is good that if we do wrong, we should take proper steps to cancel our actions, to pay our debts, as far as logically can be done." 21 To just walk away from God without addressing our sins is morally inappropriate.
Similarly, it would be morally inappropriate for God to forgive our sins without at least requiring repentance and apology. 22 But since our actions and their consequences matter, it is good for God not only to require repentance and apology, but reparation and penance as well. By doing so, God takes sin seriously, treats us as responsible moral agents, and demonstrates the value he places on the divine/human relationship.
But because of the extent of reparation and penance needed, sinners are unable to make it.
We need help from the outside. God gives us this help by providing a means of substantive reparation and penance. Swinburne writes:
If [a] child has broken the parent's window and does not have the money to pay for a replacement, the parent may give him the money wherewith to pay a glazier to put in a new window…and thereby make due reparation. The parent can refuse to accept the apology until the window is mended. Thereby he allows the child to take his action and its consequence…as seriously as he can in the circumstances of the child's initial inability to pay. That treats the child as a responsible agent, and it treats the harm done as a harm. It treats things as they are.
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Since Christ's life and death are traditionally seen as the means of atonement for human sins, Swinburne concludes that God has provided the voluntarily offered life and death of Christ as a means for sinners to offer substantive reparation and penance. 24 Since the wrongs done were human lives lived imperfectly, it was fitting for a life lived perfectly to be offered as reparation and penance. 25 It is only when sinners combine their repentance and apology with pleading the atoning work of Christ as a means of reparation and penance that God forgives them their sins and their guilt is removed.
Swinburne's theory clearly articulates an intuitively compelling understanding of atonement. It does seem good that victims of wrongdoing condition their forgiveness at times on not only repentance and apology, but also substantive reparation and penance. Since sinners are unable to provide this, God in Christ offers them a way to realize the goods of such reparation and penance. It is not that it is necessary for God to forgive sinners in this manner, but it is a fitting way for him to do so amongst other fitting ways given God's overall intentions for human salvation.
But this otherwise plausible move generates a weakness. On Swinburne's theory God could freely choose any valuable act to serve as reparation and penance. Swinburne writes:
…it is the victim of wrongdoing-in this case God-who has a right to choose, up to the limit of the equivalent to the harm done and the need for a little more in penance, how much reparation and penance to require before he will forgive. So, despite all of these considerations about man's inability to make substantial reparation and penance, God could have chosen to accept one supererogatory act of an ordinary man as adequate for the sins of the world. Or he could have chosen to accept some angel's act for this purpose. As another example, take the unfaithful husband who comes to his wife repentant, apologetic, and willing to make reparation and penance for his adultery. It seems permissible for the wife to accept these steps towards reconciliation but to nevertheless demand that he move out of the family home-at least for a time. The wife may say to her husband, "I will forgive you, but for now, pack your things and get out of the house." If there was a debate about whether or not this was fair, I take it that we would side with the wife. For it appears that the husband deserves to be treated in such a manner-he deserves to lose certain rights and privileges of family life due to his misuse of those rights and privileges. 33 This in turn provides the wrongdoer the opportunity to take himself, his act, the victim, and the relationship involved with due moral seriousness by his abiding by and perceiving the justice of the enforced demands. In the case of serious wrongdoing or repeated offenses, the absence of punishment can trivialize all of these elements.
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So when the wife demands that her unfaithful husband moves out of the family home, she takes the harm done with appropriate seriousness; she treats her husband as responsible for the consequences of his actions; and she expresses or vindicates the true value of herself and her marriage relationship both of which her husband had devalued in his adultery. Furthermore, she provides the opportunity for her husband to recognize the moral import of all of these things. If the wife does not exact some kind of punishment like that described, she runs risk of trivializing the importance of right action, responsibility, and the other moral values involved.
Having argued that there are situations in which retributive punishment is morally appropriate amongst human persons, the question now becomes whether God is in such a situation vis-a-vis sinners. As Swinburne argues, humans have failed in their duties to God, and are therefore in debt to him. What we owe God are lives lived well, rather than the second-rate lives we do live. But more than simply owing God good lives we cannot produce, we do not deserve to have the lives that have been given to us.
Assuming that earthly human life is a good and gracious gift of God and that the opportunity for loving relationship with himself is the highest good bar none, then to intentionally abuse the goods and opportunities of earthly human life, including the spiteful rejection of God's offer of eternal friendship, is a clear misuse of the rights and privileges we have been given by God. Granting the above argumentation, it is permissible for God to forcibly withdraw the rights and privileges of human life on earth and the opportunity for relationship with himself. For we deserve to lose these things due to our misuse of them. If I come in late from working all day to my wife's welcome embrace and a well-prepared dinner, only to push her away and throw the food on the floor in disgust, I certainly do not deserve such generous treatment again. Just as my wife would be right to withdraw her good gifts, so too God would be right to withdraw the good gifts of human life in friendship with himself from those who abuse and reject it. 35 To put the matter in theological terms, we deserve the divine punishment of physical and spiritual death. That is, we deserve to be physically separated from the goods and opportunities of earthly human life and we deserve to be spiritually separated from God's loving presence.
At this point I am not prepared to argue that such punishment is obligatory. In fact, I am prone to agree with Augustine, Aquinas, and Calvin that God could forgive our sins without exacting such loss. 36 Nevertheless, it is morally permissible for him to exact the loss due us, and there is great moral worth in him doing so. For, parallel to the previous cases, such an exaction of loss takes human sin seriously, it treats sinners as responsible moral agents, and it vindicates or expresses the appropriate value of both the Godhead and the divine/human relationship. The result of this is that the sinner has the opportunity to be morally educated and formed, and the provision of this opportunity is good even if sinners are unwilling to recognize the correct moral values which are expressed in the punishment. The substitution aspect of penal substitution has been bothersome to many. As Brian
Hebblethwaite declares:
What sort of judge can impose death on another or even on himself as a substitutory punishment, thus letting me go free? Such ideas are morally objectionable in their analogical base-the purely human context-before ever they get transferred, by analogy, to the divine-human context; and a fortiori, they make no moral sense when predicated of a God of love.
38
So, first off, is such a transfer of punishment from a guilty party to an innocent party right or permissible in the human context? While it is a fairly trivial objection, it has been suggested that it is a logical impossibility to punish the innocent. For instance, Anthony Quinton writes, "For the necessity of not punishing the innocent is not moral but logical. It is not, as some retributivists think, that we may not punish the innocent and ought only to punish the guilty, but that we cannot punish the innocent and must only punish the guilty." 39 So Quinton is claiming that it is part of the meaning of the word 'punish' that the one inflicted must be guilty. But as R.M. Hare points out, even if we mistakenly punish an innocent person, they were nevertheless punished. 40 This is what makes such a situation tragic. So the claim that punishment must only be of the guilty is not a logical claim, contra Quinton, but a moral one. It is not logically impossible to punish an innocent person whom we think is guilty, rather it is morally egregious to do so just because it is logically possible.
But the case of substitutionary punishment is not of this kind. The idea here is that someone voluntarily takes the guilty one's place for the punishment the guilty one deserves. It It is clear in this example that part of what makes a penal transfer just is that the infliction of punishment is the right of the one offended and it does not have to be executed. This opens up logical space for the exercise of punishment to take on various forms. What motivates the vicarious form is that the good ends which justify the punishment of the one who deserves it are also served in the punishment of the substitute.
But the practice of penal substitution in other scenarios seems wrong. We do not think it good for the mother of a convicted rapist to serve his time in prison. I propose that the reason why such a transfer is morally counter-intuitive is that while the victim still has the right to transfer the punishment, the likely good ends of such punishment would not be served by such a transfer. Given that deterrence and prevention are the main potential goods of criminal punishment, it is probably never good that such a penalty be transferred, for there is little hope of achieving these goods through a transfer. 41 But the same good ends are not at issue in the divine/human situation, and so it may be good for Christ to voluntarily serve the kind of punishment that is due sinners. Christ's voluntary submission to the crucifixion coupled with his human experience of alienation from the Father is the kind of physical and spiritual death sinners deserve. It seems fair to say that Christ experienced on the cross the loss of the good gifts and opportunities of human life in friendship with God. These are the rights and privileges we abused, and it seems that they are the rights and and thus they fail (though not intentionally) in their obligations to God. So these people too are in debt to God. But if they are truly ignorant, then punishment would not seem justified. So either the purported ignorance is a result of negligence and thus they are morally culpable for it and thereby rightly punished, or these ignorant ones will be relieved of their ignorance at some point so that they too can freely choose to either join themselves to God, repenting and apologizing for their unintentional wrongdoing against him, or they can choose to reject life in friendship with God, and would thereby be rightfully punished. 
